INTRODUCTION
Ever since the development of the prison system in America in the early 19th century, prisons have been ruled with an iron hand by administrative officials.' Prison administrators have historically exercised what many legal scholars characterize as autocratic discretion.
2 The judiciary's traditional "hands-off" policy of deference to prison authorities' supposed expertise has significantly contributed to this development. 3 The transfer of inmates within the penal system is no exception to this arbitrary discretion.. Specifically, the transfer of prisoners from the general prison population to mental hospitals for the criminally insane has been considered, until very recently, a purely administrative determination beyond judicial scrutiny. 5 Moreover, the autocratic power of prison administrators in the field of criminal commitment' is statutorily authorized in the vast majority of states. Despite recent advances in the legal rights of the mentally disturbed, 7 the statutory law of criminal commitment has gener-I D. RUDOVSKY L. J. 506 (1963) . 'See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) , and Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U. S. 236 (1976) , discussed at length in note 25 infra.
sSee notes I 11-15 and accompanying text infra. 6 The term 'criminal commitment' is herein used to describe the involuntary transfer of prison inmates to mental institutions, and is to be contrasted with the term 'civil commitment' which is herein used to describe the commitment of civilians to such institutions. While the commitment of those found incompetent to stand trial and those found innocent of criminal charges by reason of insanity are criminally related commitments, such commitments are not included within the term 'criminal commitment.'
7 The mentally ill have recently been afforded a multitude of procedural protections in their initial commitment, periodic review of their need for further confinement, and more rigorous protection of their substantive rights during confinement. ally lagged far behind. Criminal commitment procedures in most states remain a matter of administrative discretion and convenience. 9 In Arkansas, for example, when a prison staff physician (who need not even be trained in psychology or psychiatry) ascertains that a prisoner is mentally ill and certifies this finding to the warden of the prison, it becomes the warden's du4, to transfer that prisoner to the state hospital until "reason be ... restored."' 0 The South Dakota criminal commitment statute presents another glaring example of the ease by which a prisoner can be summarily transferred from his prison cell to a state mental institution. That statute provides:
Whenever it shall appear to the satisfaction of the warden and the board of charities and corrections, that any person confined in the penitentiary ... has become mentally ill ... the board may order that such person be taken from the penitentiary and be confined and treated in one of the state hospitals for the mentally ill ... and upon his recovery therefrom, if before the expiration of his sentence, that he be returned to the penitentiary."
California has a similar criminal commitment statute. In that state, a prisoner may be committed if, in the opinion of the Director of Corrections, the prisoner is mentally ill and his "rehabilitation ... may be expedited by treatment at any one of the state hospitals .... ,12 These three criminal commitment statutes aie typical of those found in most states.
This broad administrative discretion has often produced catastrophic results. For example, in Dennison v. State, 13 the claimant, Dennison, was convicted in 1926 of stealing $5 worth of candy from a roadside stand and was sentenced to ten years in prison. However, after serving slightly more than one year of that term, he was certified insane by a prison staff physician. Solely on the basis of that certification, and without any notice or hearing, prison officials transferred Dennison to Naponoch, a state mental asylum described as "a repository for unfortunates of varying degrees of imbecility, idiocy and moronity.'
14
As a result of his criminal commitment, Dennison's institutional confinement extended far beyond his original ten year prison sentence. In fact, he spent an additional 24 years in institutional custody merely on the basis of a prison staff physician's opinion that he was a "low grade moron. 15 The court however found this opinion to be a "tragic error,' 6 and noted that Dennison had been sane at the time of his commitment.' 7 "'ARK Srvr.
ANN § 59-415 (1971) . "S.D. CoMpiuViD LAXs ANN. §24-2-24 (Supp. 1977) .
' CAI. PENAl. CODE § 2684 (West Supp. 1978 '7 In fact, the court found that Dennison's confinement at Napanoch itself "caused" him to become insane. Id. at 537, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 924.
Dennison graphically illustrates the need for rigorous procedural safeguards governing the transfer of prison inmates to mental institutions. When commitment is a routine matter of administrative paper work and rubber stamps, the rights of individuals are severely jeopardized. Preservation of these rights, then, is more than a matter of human decency, it is a mandate of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution.
CRIMINAL COMMITMENT AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

The Analytical Framework
Modern procedural due process analysis is a bifurcated inquiry. First, the court must determine whether there has been a deprivation of sufficient magnitude to warrant application of the due process clause, that is, the court must question whether there has been such a "grievous loss" as to trigger due process.' 8 Second, "[o] nce it is determined that due process applied, the question remains what process is due."' 9 The answer to this question depends on the peculiar factual circumstances of the individual case and the requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property.
' , 2 0
Does Due Process Apply?
Liberty, which is the particular fourteenth amendment interest most directly involved in criminal commitment proceedings, has been given an expansive interpretation by the Supreme Court:
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty ... guaranteed [by the due process clause], the term ... [wlithout doubt ... denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God ac-cording to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized ... as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. As defined by the Court, the concept of liberty has been held to include instances wherein a "person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him .... 22 In these situations the deprivation of liberty consists of damage to the individual's "standing and associations in his community. ' ' 3 Similarly, the state deprives an individual of his liberty by imposing upon him "a stigma or other disability that forecloses his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities.
2 4
Unlike a transfer from one prison to another, which the Supreme Court has recently held to be an insufficient deprivation to trigger due process,' commitment of a prison inmate to a mental insti- challenged their transfer on due process grounds. They alleged that the administrative hearings which they had been afforded were procedurally deficient because they had not been allowed the right to confront adverse witnesses. The Court, however, held that the interprison transfer did not constitute a deprivation of sufficient magnitude to implicate the due process clause, noting: Similarly, we cannot agree that any change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner involved is sufficient to invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause. The Due Process Clause by its own force forbids the State from convicting any person of crime and depriving him of his liberty without complying fully with the requirements of the Clause. But given a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State may confine him and subject him to the rules of its prison system so long as the conditions of confinement do not otherwise violate the Constitution. The Constitution does not ... guarantee that the convicted prisoner will be placed in any particular prison ... The conviction has sufficiently extinguished the defendant's liberty interest to empower the State to confine him in any of its prisons [emphasis in original] . Id. at 224. See also, Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U. S. 236 (1976) , decided the same day as Meachum and utilizing the same rationale, holding that a prisoner may legally be transferred from one prison to another without a hearing at all, even though the transfer resulted in significantly burdensome consequences for the prisoner.
tution is accompanied by a host of deleterious consequences of sufficient magnitude to implicate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 26 Liberty in its fullest sense is at stake in criminal commitment proceedings. Through such proceedings, freedom from bodily constraints, from mental and emotional oppression, and from damage to reputational interests is put in jeopardy.
The first jeopardy to freedom is that criminal commitment results in the imposition of significantly more onerous physical restraints. The prisoner is invariably placed in a maximum security ward 27 where his freedom of movement within the institution is greatly diminished. 847 (1969) . In addition the court noted, in the appendix to its opinion, some thirty-five specific ways in which restrictions of the mental institution were significantly more onerous than the corresponding rules of the prison. These included such items as the scheduling and types of meals served, regularity of rules and procedures, types of "guarding" utilized, personal clothing and hygiene allowed, and mail privileges.
' See Developments in the Law-Civil Confmitment of the Mentally III, 87 HARV. L. R .v. 1190 , 1194 -96, 1358 -65 (1974 ("[such] deprivations of liberty may be necessary to preserve order and to protect patients from self-inflicted injury.").
' . Rosenhan, supra note 32, at 388 ("Given that the patient is in the hospital, he must be psychologically disturbed."); Wexler and Scoville, supra note 27, at 202 (Several psychology graduate students were secretly placed in a mental institution in order to observe the conditions existing in the institution first hand. One of them made the following observation regarding his inability to convince the hospital staff of his sanity and true identity:
It was about one o'clock in the morning before the technicians were finally able to sit down and talk with me. I began by telling them who I was and why I (vas there. Nothing had prepared me for their response: "Tell us more about your delusions!" In my initial shock, I became obviously and overtly confused, merely adding more to the "clinical picture" of their newest patient. I began to be filled, indeed swept, with all kinds of feelings. First was a paranoia about my own state. If the technicians really thought I was a patient, perhaps I would have difficulty getting out, a point about which Dr. Levy had been particularly reticent. But even more was an anger combined with a sense of disbelief and pity for those who really were there. I had done nothing throughout the day to allow the technicians to suspect even remotely that I had any psychological problems except present myself to the hospital. And it suddenly occurred to me that this was the ultimate criterion ifyou were here in a mental hospital there must be something wrong withyou. But, not only was there not enough wrong with me to require hospitalization, there was equally little wrong with many of the patients that I saw on our ward.
Id. (emphasis added).
instances the prisoner remains committed for the rest of his life. 4 " Consequently, the initial conimitment of a prisoner must be considered more than a mere administrative transfer from one penal facility to another.
The second jeopardy to freedom is that criminal commitment endangers the individual's liberty, as that term is used in due process analysis, by subjecting the individual to severe mental and emotional stress and oppression. Mental patients are frequently drugged into docility44-a constant state of apathy nothing short of mental oppression.
The patient is thus deprived of the freedom of his own imagination and creative though t. The pacifistic effect of these tranquilizing drugs on the individual's will to resist 4 7 deprives the patient of the very essence of his humanity and his intellect. Moreover, the very nature of institutional psychiatry, as practiced in the United States today, "There is repetitive evidence that once a patient has remained in a large mental hospital for two yeairs or moie, he is quite unlikely to leave 6xcept by death. Mental Hospitals are malign, global places. Mental patients are still beaten, shocked, drugged, or mutilated into submi ssion. Even where these abuses are controlled, as thiey are probably controlled'today in mafly places ... the environment and the haze of drug-induced docility appear to create and confirm illnesi and deviance rather than 'cure' it. 4"'Medicatfon" (in most cases Thorazine, a highly potent tranquilizer) is uniformly administered without any determination of individual need. Wexler and Scoville, supra note 27, at 193. Moreover, it "medication" is refused by the patient, it ii forcefully administered by means oftintramsular injection, and the patient is often punished with secfusion for his refusal. Ferleger, supra note 31, at 469-73.
4 For example, consider the observations of a clinical psychology graduate student who, as part "of a project examining mental health care institutes in the state of Arizona, was "planted" ' in an institution without revealing his true identity to the hospital staff or to tlhe other patients: I spent the morning ... talking to other patients. One 'oung woman interested me and I attmpted to learn something about her. This soon became a very'f"utile attempt, however, for'I found that 'she was apparently so drugged that she founf it difficult to carry as much as a ... Scientific knowledge does not contain within itself directions for its "proper" humanitarian use.
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Szasz maintains that institutional psychiatry has become a form of social engineering synonymous with institutional brainwashing. The individual whose conduct is socially unacceptable is committed, his behavior is corrected ("treated"), and his mind is reshaped. "haps the most severe deprivation involved in the commitment of prisoners to mental institutions. 64 Criminal commitment jeopardizes the transferred prisoner's psychic liberty in still another manner. It may actually cause insanity or contribute to an already existing psychiatric disorder. As one court has stated:
[W]e are faced with the obvious but terrifying possibility that the transferred prisoner may not be mentally ill at all. Yet he will be confined with men who are not only mad, but dangerously so....
[H]e will be exposed to physical, emotional, and general mental agony. Confined with those who are insane, told repeatedly that he too is insane and indeed treated as insane, it does not take much for a man to question his own sanity and in the end to succumb to some mental aberration....
[T]here is considerable evidence that a prolonged commitment in an institution providing only custodial confinement for the "mentally sick" and nothing more may itself cause serious psychological harm or exacerbate any pre-existing condition. 6 Evidence indicates that the vast majority of mental institutions throughout the country, and virtually all maximum security wards in such institutions, provide nothing more than custodial sion. Rather, it reflects society's reluctance to create adequate social or legal mechanisms to deal with the problems we dump into psychiatry's lap. We prefer to assume that by labelling the process 'medical' and its results 'treatment' we can convert coercion into benevolence and deprivation into help." 6' Indeed, while some scholars have advocated that mental patients should be recognized as possessing a constitutional right to treatment, see note 68 infra, others have taken into consideration this grave psychological oppression disguised as treatment and have concluded that courts should instead recognize the patients' constitutional right to refrse treatment. See, e.g., T. SzAsz, at 214-15 (the right to treatment rubric is "both naive and dangerous," and has been readily accepted in legal and medical psychiatric circles because it "support[s] the myth that mental illness is a medical problem that can be solved by medical means."); Shaffer, supra note 44, at 371.
" Aside from bodily constraints and emotional oppression, the final jeopardy to freedom caused by criminal commitment is the damage commitment does to the individual's reputation. The label "mentally ill," placed on the prisoner as a result of his transfer to a mental institution, stigmatizes him for the rest of his life. Upon release he is "socially ostracized and victimized by employment and educational discrimination." 7 2 In effect, the criminally committed are "'twice-cursed' as both mentally ill and criminal .... 7 The general public simply does not regard the mentally ill in the same light as they do the physically ill. In summary, the transfer of prisoners to mental institutions is much more than a mere administrative relocation within the penal system. The transfer actually results in a significant deprivation of physical, psychic and reputational interests. Since the due process clause is designed to protect against deprivations to liberty, the prisoner must be afforded procedural safeguards which comport with constitutional due process standards, before his transfer can be decreed legal.
What Process Is Due?
Once the due process clause is triggered, the procedural safeguards required by the particular factual circumstances must be determined. A psychiatric label has a life and an influence of its own. Once the impression has been formed that the patient is schizophrenic, the expectation is that he will continue to be schizophrenic. When a sufficient amount of time has passed, during which the patient has done nothing bizarre, he is considered to be in remission and available for discharge. But the label endures beyond discharge, with the unconfirmed expectation that he will behave as a schizophrenic again. ing of competing interests 77 and on an interpreta-the side of strict procedural safeguards.ss The tion of the rudimentary concepts of fundamental states' interest in streamlined criminal commitfairness: "Due Process" is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its context varies according to specific factual contexts.... [As a generalization, it can be said that due process embodies the differing rules offair play, which through the years have become associated with differing types of proceedings.
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Despite the amorphous character of due process, the Court has established certain "benchmarks ' 79 deemed necessary to ensure fairness and "provide a meaningful hedge against erroneous action."8 ' Among these benchmarks is the concept that due process requires for deprivation of life, liberty or property to be "preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. In addition to notice and the opportunity to be heard, there are other "quasi-fundamentals" which the Court has indicated will be required in nearly every instance:
In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.... [Moreover] , "[tjhe right to be heard would be, in miny cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.
' 82
The balance of interests involved in a criminal commitment includes a number of factors which should cause the judicial scale to weigh heavily on 77 Id at 579. 78 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960) . "Due process is that which comports with the deepest notions of what is fair and right and just. The more fundamental the beliefs are the less likely they are to be explicitly stated," Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
78 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 578. sIol at 583. 81 Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) . As evidence that even these seemingly immutable requisites are not absolute, however, see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) , where the Court for the first time found that a deprivation was involved (corporal punishment of students by teachers) of sufficient magnitude to trigger the due process clause, and yet held that due process was satisfied without any hearing on the propriety vel non of that deprivation (the student would receive only apost-deprivation opportunity to be heard on the limited issue of whether the punishment meted out was excessive; and even this would have to be initiated by the student by way of a subsequent remedial suit for damages). [t]he establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy which may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.8
The fact that full adversary hearings are currently mandated in criminal commitment proceedings in a significant number of states, amply demonstrates that stringent procedural safeguards are administratively feasible and not prohibitively expensive.8 7 It has been argued that the state has another 83 Indeed the severe mental oppression to which the individual is subjected as a result of commitment, both civil and criminal, has led one legal scholar to the conclusion that "the ultimate objective ... interest in streamlined commitment procedures. Under its police power the state has an interest in protecting third parties from the alleged mentally ill individual, and under its parens patriae power an interest in protecting this individual from himself. Therefore, to the extent that rigorous procedures "may impair the state's ability to commit a person who falls within [state commitment] standards, the state has an interest in preventing its adoption." s However, this argument is fallacious in several respects. For one thing, the state's interest in protecting the community from the mentally ill individual may be "infringed by procedures which may increase the likelihood of error, such as the recognition of a right to remain silent, but not by those procedures designed only to increase the accuracy of the factfinding process, such as the provision of a hearing on the merits.
' ' s 9 Moreover, prisons are by their very nature controlled environments. The possibility that a mentally disturbed prisoner may harm his fellow inmates is substantially minimized by prison security. If indeed the prisoner does pose a danger to fellow inmates, an emergency commitment procedure could be established whereby the full adversary hearing is postponed.90 Finally, streamlined criminal commitment procedures, and indeed criminal commitment itself, cannot be justified by benevolent protestations that the commitment is for the prisoner's own well-being. Patients in mental institutions do not receive adequate treatment and their condition is more likely to be exacerbated than ameliorated by their commitment.
9
' This is particularly true with respect to committed prisoners inevitably placed in maximum security wards where mere custodial confinement is the rule rather than the exception.
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In contrast to the nature of the state's interest, the prisoner's interests involved in criminal commitment proceedings are immense. As previously noted, his liberty is gravely jeopardized, and he stands to suffer significantly if committed.
93 More- One need only glance at the diagnostic manual of the American Psychiatric Association to learn what an elastic concept mental illness is. It ranges from massive functional inhibition characteristic of one form of catatonic schizophrenia to those seemingly slight aberrancies associated with an emotionally unstable personality, but which are so close to conduct in which we all engage as to define the entire continuum involved. Obviously the definition of mental illness is left largely to the user and is dependent upon the norms of adjustment that he employs. Usually the use of the phrase "mental illness" effectively masks the actual norms being applied. And, because of the unavoidably ambiguous generalities in which the American Psychiatric Association describes its diagnostic categories, the diagnostician has the ability to shoehorn into the mentally diseased class almost any person he wishes, for whatever reason, to put there. 6 This assessment of the concept of mental illness comports with Dr. Thomas Szasz's belief that mental illness is a "myth," 9 7 something which psychi- ' Moreover, examinations conducted by prison staff physicians generally consist of a single ten to fifteen minute interview, which is hardly conducive to thorough medical diagnosis.'°2 Furthermore, psychiatry has developed an innate tendency toward overprediction. That is, psychiatrists operate with a strong bias toward what statisticians call the type 2 error. This is to say that [they] are more inclined to call a healthy person sick (a false positive, type 2) than a sick person healthy (a false positive, type 1). The reasons for this are not hard to find: it is clearly more dangerous to misdiagnose illness than health. Better to err on the side of caution, to suspect illness even among the healthy.iD Overprediction is reinforced in the criminal commitment setting by a number of factors. First, many psychiatrists equate antisocial criminal behavior with psychiatric malady.'(' Consequently, they are likely to interpret the prisoner's present incarceration and past prison record as evidence of psychiatric disorder. Second, the examining psychiatrist may view his recommendation of commitment as being in the prisoner's best interests, since commitment will afford the prisoner an escape from the supposed horrors of prison confinement. Finally, the imprecision and bias toward overprediction inherent in the "science" of psychiatry is not limited to that profession, but instead is transmitted to the judicial process. It has a significant impact on the prisoner who is considered for commitment because judges and juries give unquestioning deference to the psychiatrists' recommendations and conclusions. 2°5 The nature of psychiatry and its impact on the criminal commitment process requires observance of stringent procedural safeguards in the commitment determination. As noted in United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin,'O° "[i] f the disparate opinions of psychiatrists and the vagaries of proof and prediction suggest anything, it is the desirability of the utmost care in reaching the commitment decision.
' ' Thus, it is imperative that a full adversary '' Wexler and Scoville, supra note 27, at 65. hearing be afforded the prisoner prior to commitment. The prisoner should be granted the right to trial by jury, the right to be present and confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the right to be represented by counsel. Some psychiatric scholars maintain that a fullblown hearing may have a traumatic effect on the "patient" and exacerbate his condition. From this they have argued that the commitment determination should be purely medical, excluding the judicial process altogether.'0 However, given the potential abuse of psychiatric power, this result must be avoided if individual autonomy and integrity is to be preserved. "Above all else, control of institutions, and of the processes for entering and leaving them, has to be taken away from the doctors."' 0 9 The due process clause is designed to protect against this very type of arbitrary and discretionary action.
In addition to a full adversary hearing, certain other precautions are necessary. First, the prisoner should be entitled to independent psychiatric examination by a court-selected psychiatrist or a panel of psychiatrists. However, considering the imprecision which inheres in the "science" of psychiatry, psychiatric evidence must not be accorded conclusive weight. Rather, it "must be limited ... to a necessary rather than a sufficient condition for commitment."" 0 Second, if the hearing results in a commitment order, periodic review of that order should be required. This review must be more than a mere administrative glance at the individual's file and a short interview by the staff psychiatrist, and should consider whether continued hospitalization is needed. Finally, the prisoner should not be committed unless it is unequivocally shown that he is in need of psychiatric treatment, that he will receive such treatment, and that failure to initiate treatment will pose a clear and present danger of physical harm to the prisoner or to others. No individual should be involuntarily committed merely because his behavior is annoying or incomprehensible to others. The belief that treatment will benefit the prisoner is insufficient justification for commitment. The age of state-enforced therapeutic paternalism should become history. Civil commitment procedures in Illinois1 4 can be initiated by any person eighteen years or older filing a petition with the court, asserting that an individual is in need of mental treatment. The court then appoints a physician to examine the individual, if such an examination has not already occurred within seventy-two hours of the filing of the petition. A copy of the petition and the court order of examination must be personally delivered to the individual, his attorney, and the individual's two nearest relatives at least thirty-six hours before the examination.
If the examining physician certifies to the court within seventy-two hours of the examination that the individual is in need of mental treatment and he sets forth the reasons supporting this conclusion, the court sets the matter for a hearing. This hearing must be held not more than five business days after the court's receipt of the petition and the certificate of the examining physician. Notice of the time and place of the hearing must be given to the individual and to such other persons as the court deems appropriate. Jury trial on the question of need for mental treatment can be demanded by the individual, his spouse, any relative or friend, or an attorney appearing for any of them. If no jury trial is demanded, the court hears the matter.
The court then appoints one or more examining physicians to conduct independent personal examinations and to file detailed reports regarding the individual's need for mental treatment. The patient is entitled to be present at the hearing unless the court finds that his presence would constitute a serious danger to his physical or emotional well-being. He is to be represented by legal counsel, to have counsel appointed if he is indigent, to have the testimony of at least one of the examining physicians given at the hearing, and to have a record of the hearing kept. If the hearing results in a finding that the individual is in need of mental treatment or is mentally retarded, the court orders hospitalization, but only after a determination that no alternative form of care or treatment (such as care by relatives) is available.
Procedures for discharge are numerous. First, the court order of hospitalization is valid for only a one year period. Any hospitalization after this one year period requires a new court order after another hearing with all the procedural guaranties of the initial hearing. Second, the individual may at any time file a petition for discharge accompanied by his own physician's certificate that he is no longer in need of mental treatment. Third, the superintendent of the hospital is required to conduct an examination of the patient and review the need for continued hospitalization at least every six months. If he concludes that the individual does not need further mental treatment, the superintendent is required to grant him absolute discharge. Finally, at least once during the patient's first year of hospitalization and at least once in every two year period thereafter, the superintendent is required to file a written report with Department of Mental Health "setting forth the reasons supporting the need for further hospitalization." ' 5 He is also required to give notice of this report to the patient, his attorney, his nearest relative, and two other persons designated by the patient. In this notice, the superintendent must also set forth the right of the patient and of any person on the patient's behalf to request a hearing on the need for further hospitalization. At this hearing, which must be conducted within ten days of the request, the individual is entitled to all the procedural guaranties of the initial hearing.
The Illinois civil commitment procedures exemplify the elaborate framework for safeguards which has been imposed upon the state in the civil commitment process. Noting the existence of these elaborate civil statutes, a number of federal courts have recently considered whether the lax criminal commitment procedures violate the equal protection clause. Relying heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Baxstrom, n6 these courts have ,'5 Id., § 10-2.
,'6 383 U.S. 107 (1966) .
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concluded that such criminal statutes cannot withstand such equal protection attack. In Baxstroma, the petitioner had been convicted of second degree assault and sentenced to a maximum prison term of three years. While incarcerated, he was certified insane by a prison physician and transferred to Dannemora, the New York state mental institution for the criminally insane. Upon the expiration of his prison term, the petitioner was civilly committed under a special statutory procedure for commitment of prisoners, which did not allow de novo review by a jury on the queston of sanity vel non, as was provided for by statute in the civil commitment of all other persons. The Court held that this procedure -violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because it believed that the disparate treatment of ex-prisoners was irrational. As the Court maintained:
Equal protection does not require that all persons be dealt with identically, but it does require that a distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made.... Classification of mentally ill persons as either insane or dangerously insane [i.e. criminally insane] of course may be a reasonable distinction for purposes of determining the type of custodial or medical care to be given, but it has no relevance whatever in the context of the opportunity to know whether a person is mentally ill at alL For purposes of granting judicial review before ajury of the question whether a person is mentally ill and in need of institutionalization, there is no conceivable basis for distinguishing the commitment of a person who is nearing the end of a penal term from all other civil commitments.
17
The Court's holding in Baxstrom was limited to equal protection as it relates to the procedures for continued commitment of prisoners after their prison sentences have expired. Although the Court has declined to extend that holding, the underlying rationale of Baxstrom applies with equal strength to the commitment of prisoners during their prison sentence."
8 The fact that an individual has been convicted of a crime is a wholly irrelevant consideration in determining the commitment procedures n1 d. at 111-12 (emphasis in original). "8 The Court has had ample opportunity to decide the issue but has thus far refrained from doing so. It denied certiorari in United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold; 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969 ), and in Matthews v. Hardy, 420 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1969 ), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1010 (1970 , which are discussed at length infra. Moreover, in Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972), the Court took note of the holdings in Schuster and Matthews, but declined to decide the issue.
to be applied to that individual. As one lower federal court has explained Baxstrom:
The Supreme Court struck down the New York system not because Baxstrom was reaching the end of his sentence, but because it held dangerousness is not relevant to the procedures for determining whether "a person is mentally ill at all."... Baxstroa thus might be said to require the conclusion that, while prior criminal conduct is relevant to the determination whether a person is mentally ill and dangerous, it cannot justify denial of procedural safeguards for that determination." 9 This reasoning has prompted several other federal courts to hold that procedures for committing prison inmates before the expiration of their sentences, which are inferior to generally applicable civil commitment procedures, violate equal protection.
The first such holding came in United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold.' 2° In that case the petitioner Schuster was convicted in 1931 of second degree murder and sentenced to a prison term of from twenty-five years to life. Ten years after his conviction, Schuster was transferred to Dannemora." Baxstror clearly instructs that the procedures to be followed in determining whether one is committable must be unaffected by the irrelevant circumstance that one is or has recently been under sentence pursuant to a criminal conviction, although the fact that one has committed a crime may be relevant to the substantive conclusion that he is mentally ill. hope that he [was] preparing himself 127 for the day when he would be released. ' ' 12 s Schuster challenged the legality of his commitment on equal protection grounds, contending that he was not afforded the same procedural rights allowed to civilians in contesting involuntary commitment. He prayed that he be returned to prison where he would be eligible for parole or "at least be removed from the grievously distressing atmosphere of an institution ... which houses the insane."
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The court, in analyzing the legality of Schuster's commitment, first noted the deleterious efforts which had resulted from the transfer to Dannemora: the increased restraints upon his liberty, the increased indignities, and the "physical, emotional, and general mental agony"' 3 to which he had 127 Schuster was not assigned work at Dannemora. He testified that his spare time was spent studying so that he would be prepared "to step into an honorable job" upon his release. 410 F.2d at 1076.
'28410 F.2d at 1076. Indeed, it is very questionable whether Schuster was suffering any psychological disturbance at all. The court set forth at great length the findings of the state's psychiatrist in a prior state proceeding on one of Schuster's previous petitions for habeas corpus:
At the 1963 state hearing, only one psychiatrist, a Dr. Carson, testified. He admitted that Schuster was "an individual whose conduct in general is correct, who uses impeccable logic" and that "he shows no obvious signs of mental illness such as deterioration, untidiness, hallucinatory experiences, bizarre ideas or bizarre behavior." Nonetheless, Dr. Carson concluded that Schuster was mentally ill since he had a paranoid condition. "This is the type of illness," Carson explained, "in which an entire delusional but logical belief is based on a single false premise, and if one allows the truth of the false premises the patient's behavior no longer appears abnormal***" Dr. Bzxstrom clearly instructs that the procedures to be followed in determining whether one is committable must be unaffected by the irrelevant circumstance that one is or has recently been under sentence pursuant to a criminal conviction, although the fact that one has committed a crime may be relevant to the substantive conclusion that he is mentally ill."
The court ordered that Schuster be given a hearing on the question of his sanity with substantially all the procedural safeguards then afforded to civilians in involuntary commitment proceedings. If that hearing resulted in a determination that Schuster was sane, he was to be returned to prison.1 3 After Schuster, the constitutionality of criminal commitment procedures was again at issue in Matthews v. Hardy."3 In that case, the appellant Matthews was convicted of manslaughter in 1965 and sentenced to a prison term of from four to fourteen years. After serving a year and a half of this sentence, he was transferred to St. Elizabeth's Hospital pursuant to a District of Columbia statute which provided for commitment of a prisoner upon 13 The court noted that the procedures followed at the time of its opinion provided for essentially the same procedures as 1941 civil commitment did. However, civil commitment procedures in New York had since then improved substantially. Id. at 1083.
"2 Id. at 1081 (emphasis in original). '33 Circuit Judge Moore, dissenting, would have deferred to the state determinations of Schuster's insanity and need for confinement in a mental institution. He criticized the majority for its judicial legislation and interference in New York's administration of its laws and prisons.
However, in contrast to the Schuster court, the Matthews court did not hold the challenged criminal commitment statute uncohstitutional. Instead, the court read the civil commitment procedural safeguards into the criminal commitment statute to save that statute's constitutionality.
In addition to the criminal commitment procedures in New York and in the District of Columbia, the criminal commitment statutes in several.other jurisdictions have been subjected to equal protection scrutiny and have failed that test. These jurisdictions include Connecticut, 4 2 Pennsylvania, making the commitment determination largely a matter of administrative discretion, are unconstitutional on equal protection as well as on due process grounds.
CONCLUSION
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, the transfer of a prisoner to a mental institution constitutes much more than a mere administrative relocation of that prisoner within the penal system. Criminal commitment engenders severe deprivations of individual liberty. Freedom from bodily constraints, from mental and emotional oppression, and from damage to reputational interests is jeopardized. Thus, due process necessitates the observance of procedural safeguards in criminal commitment proceedings to ensure that the commitment determination is not arbitrarily and erroneously made. Furthermore, the equal protection clause demands that these procedural safeguards be at least as stringent in their protection of the rights of the individual as the procedures utilized in the civil commitment process.
Yet despite these clear constitutional mandates, criminal commitment in the vast majority of states is statutorily left to the absolute discretion of prison officials in conjunction with prison staff physicians. This fact alarmingly demonstrates the urgent need for reform. The states' interests in administrative convenience and efficiency are subordinate to the individual's interests in liberty. Thus, the criminal commitment decision must forever be removed from "the domain of the correctional officials . ... 147 JOSEPH F. LOOK victed of a crime. In order to avoid holding that section unconstitutional as violative of equal protection, the court read into it the more rigorous procedural safeguards provided for in civil commitment proceedings. 
